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Abstract
Controllers and pilots must work together to ensure safe and efficient helicopter flight within
the London control zone. Subjective ratings of pilot perception of controller responsibility for
five key flight tasks were obtained from thirty helicopter pilots. Three types of airspace were
investigated. Results indicate that there is variation in pilot understanding of controller
responsibility compared to the formal regulations that define controller responsibility.
Significant differences in the perception of controller responsibility were found for the task of
aircraft separation in class D airspace and along helicopter routes. Analysis of the patterns of
response suggests that task type rather than the airspace type may be the key factor. Results
are framed using the concept of a shared mental model. This research demonstrates that pilots
flying in complex London airspace, have an expectation of controller responsibility for
certain flight tasks, in certain airspace types that is not supported by aviation regulation.
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Practitioner Summary
The responsibility for tasks during flight varies according to the flight rules used and airspace
type. Helicopter pilots may attribute responsibility to controllers for tasks when controllers
have no responsibility as defined by regulation. This variation between pilot perceptions of
controller responsibility could affect safety within the London control zone.
21. Introduction
Pilots and controllers are part of two operationally independent systems (Hoc and Debernard,
2002). Working as a team across this complex sociotechnical, system-of-systems the
controller-pilot interface ensures the safe progress of flights (Harris and Stanton, 2010). A
key dimension of a systems-of-systems is the definition and operation of the interface
between the different systems (Siemieniuch and Sinclair, 2015). Pilots need to conduct
defined tasks to ensure the safety of their system. System evolution, driven by a goal of an
improved level of safety, has defined that from time-to-time, controllers assume
responsibility for some of these pilot tasks. The transfer of responsibility for a task between
the systems, across the interface is defined by aviation regulation, which is common, or
shared between the pilot and controller systems. A shared understanding of who holds
responsibility for each of the key tasks under the various combinations of task, airspace and
flight rules types is essential for the safe and timely transition of responsibility of the tasks as
the context changes. A task left unmonitored or incomplete can result in a degradation of
safety.
Systems comprising more than one person have properties over and above those individuals
making up the system and the various actors within the system may have common elements
to their understanding which allows them to act in a co-ordinated manner (Dobbins et al,
2015). The pilot and controller systems are components of the wider aviation system. Salas et
al (1992) defined a team as “two or more individuals, who have specific roles, perform
interdependent tasks, are adaptable and share a common goal” A system can be viewed as a
team comprising of interacting members forming an integrated whole (Jonker, et al., 2011).
There is converging evidence that suggests that humans working in teams employ shared
mental models to represent relevant information about the task. Although teams can be
3considered as face-to-face groups, they can also be geographically distributed individuals
communicating using phones, radios, and other devices as is the case in the aviation system
(Scheutz, M., 2017). A shared mental model has been defined as ‘knowledge structures held
by team members that enable them to form accurate explanations and expectations for the
task, and in turn, coordinate their actions and adapt their behaviour to the demands of the
task and other team members’ (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). When team members can
communicate and strategize freely, shared mental models may not be so critical to
performance (Stout et al., 1999). The team members can discuss the next move and does not
need to rely on pre-existing knowledge and understanding. Under conditions where
communication is more difficult or restricted, shared mental models contribute to
performance as they allow team members to predict the needs and behaviours of others in
terms of shared expectations (Stout et al., 1999; Pritchett and Midkiff, 1995; Cannon-Bowers
et al., 1993). In the aviation environment controllers and pilots do not tend to engage in free-
speech because of the imposed highly procedural communication and the limited time
available to each party. This constrained and procedural communication encourages, and we
suggest demands, the use of shared mental models. A shared mental model can allow pilots
and controllers to draw on their own pre-existing knowledge as a basis for predicting the
behaviour of the other party and selecting actions that are consistent and coordinated
(Mathieu et al., 2000; Marks et al., 2000). A shared mental model does not imply an identical
mental model, but “rather, the crucial implication of shared mental model theory is that team
members hold compatible mental models that lead to common expectations for the task and
team” (Canon-Bowers et al., 1993).
In this research, we propose that the understanding of individual responsibilities at this
interface is informed by a mental model (Carayon et al., 2015). We suggest that compatible
mental models contribute to a shared mental model generating the common set of
4expectations described by Cannon-Bowers et al. In this article we examine helicopter pilot
understanding of controller responsibility across a range of tasks. Differences in
understanding may affect helicopter pilot expectation, confounding the overall shared mental
model to which we have alluded.
Key tasks are examined such as maintaining appropriate physical separation from the ground,
other aircraft, and vertical obstructions such as telecommunication towers and tall buildings.
The safety of the aircraft is also highly-influenced by the flight being conducted in
appropriate weather conditions, and the application of the correct set of flight rules by the
pilot, for the weather encountered. For example, in conditions of good visibility, the pilot will
apply Visual Flight Rules (VFR), and in conditions of poor visibility, the pilot will apply
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). In the latter case, the pilot will fly with sole reference to the
cockpit instrumentation.
We focus on London airspace defined as the inner and outer areas of the London Control
Zone and the London City Control Zone. We use structured interviews employing scenarios
presenting five key tasks in three different airspace types. Pilot expectation was compared
against controller responsibility as defined by regulation. Differences are explained as
variation in the mental-model of helicopter pilots.
52. Method
2.1 Design
The key tasks were identified from a review of aviation regulation conducted by the authors.
Aircraft separation, terrain clearance, obstacle clearance, determination of the suitability of
the weather, and selection of the flight rules were identified (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013;
European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013). Table 1 summarises these formal responsibilities
of pilots and controllers. From these tasks, the controller is only responsible for aircraft
separation within Class A airspace, and aircraft separation for flights conducted under Special
VFR.
[Table 1 near here]
Structured interviews were used to elicit pilot perception of controller responsibility.
Participants were asked about controller responsibility across the three types of airspace for
each of the five key tasks identified. Three helicopter flight profiles were developed to
stimulate consideration of the specific types of airspace and associated procedures and rules.
Five questions were developed to assess the magnitude of pilot expectation of controller level
of responsibility for the tasks. Pilots were asked to rate the level of controller responsibility
using a visual analogue scale (VAS) for each of the five tasks. Visual analogue scales
comprise a continuous line with two or more labels. These labels are termed ‘scale anchors’
and a VAS must have at least two scale anchors at the ends of the line. Participants then mark
a point on the line which aligns with their subjective view in the context of the question being
asked. A distance measurement from one of the scale anchors or the mid-point can then be
taken representing a value. For example, a typical Likert scale: strongly agree, agree etc.
could be re-expressed as a VAS with the anchor points ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.
6Measurement equivalence between the Likert and VAS formats has been demonstrated
empirically by Kuhlman et al. (2017). Advantages of the VAS approach include greater
granularity of response since many Likert scales measure across five or seven points. In
addition, Likert scales do need to be scaled. The use of considered scale anchors increases the
wide range of the constructs that can being measured and then reliably exposed to statistical
procedures that demand interval level data (Reips and Funke, 2008).
2.2 Participants
The study was approved by the University ethics board and informed consent was given prior
to participation. Thirty participants were recruited opportunistically by approaching
helicopter companies and helicopter flying schools. A snowball sampling approach was used
where participants recommended suitable acquaintances. Participants were required to be
holders of a UK national or EASA helicopter commercial pilot or airline transport pilot
licence. Participants were broadly divided in half by number of flights conducted. Fifteen
participants had conducted 100 flights or more inside the London airspace within the last 10
years (median = 200, range 100 – 3000). Fifteen participants had conducted fewer than 100
flights inside London airspace within the last 10 years (median= 15, range = 1 - 69). Fourteen
participants had held a twin-engine helicopter rating within the last 10 years. Fourteen
participants had held an instrument rating within the last ten years whilst twelve participants
held both a twin-engine and an instrument rating within the last 10 years.
2.3 Materials
Flight profiles were developed to anchor participants to specific scenarios. Industry standard
flight charts and written descriptions of the flight profiles were generated and developed as
scenario cards. The three flight profiles were a route along Helicopter Route ‘H3’ from
7Bagshot Visual Reporting Point to Battersea Heliport using the standard route and heights, a
transit of Class D airspace from north-to-south overhead London City Airport at one
thousand feet, and a direct routing through Class D airspace from Brent Reservoir Visual
Reporting Point to Battersea Heliport at the standard heights normally directed by Air Traffic
Control. The five questions relating to the different tasks for each of the scenarios were
developed comprising: “Considering Flight Profile one [two, three], please indicate how
much responsibility you expect the air traffic controller to have for (1) terrain separation; (2)
obstacle separation; (3) aircraft separation from your aircraft; (4) determining the suitability
of the weather; (5) determining the flight rules?”. A 150 mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
was presented to participants to record their subjective perception of responsibility. Four
equally spaced text anchors were provided beneath the VAS representing: not at all
responsible, somewhat responsible, mostly responsible, and completely responsible. A free
text box under each VAS was provided to record participant comment if given.
2.4 Procedure
After giving informed consent, demographic data was collected. Participants then answered
questions about reference sources used to determine who holds responsibility for the key
tasks, before and during flight. Participants were then presented with answer booklet and a
brief description of the developed flight profiles together with the scenario card. Participants
were reminded that all flights were under VFR and that the participant could ask for any
question to be repeated. For each participant, the five questions were repeated for each of the
three types of airspace, and all fifteen questions were presented in a randomised order. The
participants were asked to indicate their magnitude of expectation for controller responsibility
for each task within each type of airspace by placing a mark on the VAS. Participants were
then thanked for their participation and debriefed.
83. Results
3.1 Sources of reference used by pilots
The five most frequent sources of reference reported by the participants before a flight to
obtain information about who is responsible for the key tasks include other pilots (17),
aeronautical information publication (15), communication with air traffic control (10), air
navigation order (4) and navigation charts (3). Participants reported four sources of
information that they would use to obtain information about who was responsible for the key
tasks during flight. Recall was reported as the most frequent (23) followed by asking the
controller (17), navigation charts (6) and other, commercial publications (1). The data
collected on the use of reference sources to define responsibility for the key tasks during
flight by pilots indicates that recall and asking the controller are used frequently.
3.2 Perception of responsibility scores
Participant scores for expectation of controller responsibility range from zero (not at all
responsible) to 15 (completely the responsible). The median level of expectation of controller
responsibility is shown for each of the five tasks within each of the three types of airspace at
Figure 1. Median levels of responsibility are shown by solid horizontal bars for each task within
each type of airspace. The edge of the boxes shows the interquartile range and the whiskers
show minimum and maximum values. Outliers (>1.5 × IQR) are shown as dashes. High
variability and many outliers are observed across all data indicating variability of perception
of controller responsibility. Aircraft separation within all types of airspace possessed the
highest values of pilot expectation of controller responsibility, followed by determination of
flight rules.
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Figure 1: Expectation of Controller Responsibility by Task and Airspace
Examination of the distribution of the data revealed departure from normality. Distributions
were typically highly skewed towards each end of the scale. This is to be expected since the
concept of controller responsibility is inherently bipolar. It would be surprising if normally
distributed data were found since this would indicate a greater level of uncertainty amongst
pilots as to whether the controller was or was not responsible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
support the visual inspections of the distribution and the theoretical position. Significant
departures from normality were found in each condition. This characteristic of the data
precludes the use of parametric inferential-statistics for analysis.
To answer the research hypothesis that there will be differences in the expectation of
responsibility across task and airspace type, two different analyses were conducted. Firstly,
significance testing was used to establish whether there were significant differences between
the median responsibility score and the regulatory designation of responsibility allocated to
each task and airspace combination. Secondly, multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to
understand the similarities and differences between responsibility judgements assigned to
each task and airspace combination.
The median of each task-airspace combination was tested against a value indicating the
expectation of full controller responsibility or no controller responsibility. Selection of this
value is not straightforward. Since pilot expectation of responsibility was measured on a
visual analogue scale of 0 to 15, it is tempting to test against a value of 0 or 15. However, this
would produce a sharp-null hypothesis, increasing the probability of a Type I Error; a
significant effect claimed when none exists. Secondly, linear scales are subject to central-
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tendency bias and participants can demonstrate an unwillingness to record a response at the
extremes of the scale (Foddy, 1993). In summary, a null-hypothesis using 0 or 15 as the test
value may say more about participant use of the scale than the pattern of pilot expectation of
controller responsibility. No data in literature is applicable in establishing the extent of this
bias on this scale. In order to mitigate this bias, conservative test values at the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the data were used to test the hypothesis. These values correspond to 3.75 and
11.25 on the 0 - 15 scale and require a more conservative result from a hypothesis test to
evidence a statistically significant difference than the use of 0 or 15.
Visual inspection of the variation around the median indicated that the assumption of
symmetric distribution around the median cannot be supported. A non-parametric one sample
test Wilcoxon test was considered and subsequently rejected due to its restrictive assumption
associated with a symmetric distribution of the median differences. A one-sample sign-test
does not require symmetry around the median and was selected. The reduced set of
assumptions used by the sign-test does reduce the statistical power available to detect small
differences and therefore could be regarded as a highly conservative test of differences.
All variables were tested against a directional, one-tailed hypothesis using Minitab 17. The
null hypothesis was aligned with the regulatory locus of responsibility for the task-airspace
combination. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the median value of the
responsibility scores is at variance with the regulatory requirement. Aircraft separation in
Class A airspace is the responsibility of the controller and so a test value of < 11.25 was used.
All other task and airspace combinations used a test value of > 3.75. A Bonferroni correction
was used to control the familywise error rate among the fifteen tests, holding α at the 
conventional 0.05. A new critical value of <0.003 was required to achieve significance.
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Results of the one-sample sign test indicate significant differences in median of pilot
expectation of controller responsibility for aircraft separation in Class D airspace and
helicopter routes, see Table 2. This indicates that pilots tended to assign a greater level of
responsibility to controllers than defined by the regulations. High variability is also notable in
pilot expectation of controller responsibility for flight rule determination across all three
types of airspace, as evidenced by the high number of responses away from the regulatory
definition.
[Table 2 near here]
The high variability in responses across all tasks and airspace type warrants further analysis
to understand the patterns of responses across different tasks and airspace types. Multi-
dimensional Scaling (MDS) was used to understand the relationships between the patterns of
pilot responses, presenting these patterns graphically. The PROXimity SCALing
(PROXSCAL) algorithm available in IBM SPSS 22 was employed to understand
relationships between the variables in common space (Lewis-Beck et al, 2017).
Figure 2 shows iterations from one to fourteen dimensions. Higher stress indicates greater
difficulty in fitting the variables into common space of the related number of dimensions.
Solutions using more than two-dimensions do not show a significant rise in stress and are
straightforward to represent graphically. The procedure was re-run specifying two-
dimensional common space. In MDS, dimensions need not be interpreted as latent or
underlying variables. The purpose of this techniques to examine similar response patterns in
the assignment of controller responsibility by the pilot for the five tasks within the three
different types of airspace. Tentative interpretations of the dimensions are proposed.
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Figure 2: Normalised Raw Stress by Dimension
In the common space polar-plot at Figure 3, unfilled shapes represent Class A airspace, grey-
filled represent Class D airspace and black-filled represent H-routes. Three groups of
responses are evident in the common space plot. A group of weather suitability, terrain
clearance and obstacle clearance tasks have similar patterns of response. Two further groups
comprising aircraft separation tasks and flight-rule selection tasks are evident.
[Figure 3 near here]
Figure 3: Common Space Plot of Tasks for all Airspace Types
One interpretation of the dimensions is that the horizontal axis represents pilot expectation of
controller responsibility. Higher expectation of controller responsibility is found to the right
of the plot. The vertical axis represents a pilot expectation of shared responsibility to varying
degrees between the pilot and the controller.
Weather suitability, terrain and obstacle clearance are grouped to the left-hand side of the
vertical axis and close to the origin of the horizontal axis indicating that pilots have a lower
expectation of controller responsibility and a lower expectation of shared responsibility.
Interestingly, the task of determining weather suitability for H-routes moves towards a higher
level of expectation for controller responsibility and a higher level of shared responsibility
than the other tasks within this group. The task of aircraft separation within Class A airspace
is defined in regulation as wholly the controller’s responsibility and this is reflected in the
high value of pilot expectation for controller responsibility displayed. The values for flight
rule determination are grouped to the right of the vertical axis indicating that pilots have an
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expectation of controller responsibility which is reflected in the controller ability to close
airspace to flights conducted under VFR. However, the lower values of shared responsibility
compared to aircraft separation indicate that pilots believe that the responsibility for the task
lies within the domain of their system. Only the pilot is able to interpret the weather
encountered and determine the appropriate flight rules.
4. Discussion
This research has revealed variation in helicopter pilot perception of controller responsibility
inside the London and London City control zones. Results indicate that pilots assign
responsibility to controllers for separation when flying in both Class D airspace and when in
H-routes. Controllers have no responsibility for aircraft separation within Class D airspace. In
H-routes, London airspace controllers frequently delegate the responsibility of aircraft
separation to helicopter pilots under a locally developed procedure known as ‘deemed
separation’. A high-level of variation in pilot expectation of controller responsibility was
found for terrain and obstacle clearance, the determination of weather criteria, and the
selection of flight rules across all three types of airspace. Aviation regulation defines that
controllers have no responsibility for these three tasks. The results suggest that pilots have a
level of expectation of controller responsibility for tasks when the controller is not required to
have such responsibility, as defined by shared or common regulation. Any level of pilot
expectation of controller responsibility beyond that defined in regulation could promote a
mismatch between what tasks the pilot is expecting the controller to take responsibility for,
and those tasks that the controller is responsible for. For example, one assumption held by
pilots could be that a controller is closely monitoring the flight profile of the helicopter on
radar when not required to do so and would then intervene in the event of an unsafe situation
developing, for example anticipated loss of separation.
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This interpretation is supported by the significant differences in the median of pilot
expectation of controller responsibility for aircraft separation in class D airspace and H-
routes. Pilots tended to assign a greater level of responsibility to controllers for aircraft
separation than defined by the regulations, and that they perceive the task as a shared
responsibility. This may be related to the location of expertise and the radar information with
the controller. The blurring of responsibility could be an expectation that controllers continue
to monitor VFR and Special VFR helicopter flights after initial radio contact and permission
to enter the zones has been granted. Helicopter pilots within London airspace are warned by
controllers if they deviate from their designated or agreed flight path, and sometimes pilots
are reminded of large vertical obstacles and approach high-ground by controllers. It may be
the case that pilots perceive the flight paths of their helicopters to be closely monitored on
radar when they are not.
Regulation defines that pilots are responsible for the selection of flight rules within all three
types of airspace. Although no significant differences in median expectation of responsibility
were found, the relative values of the responses indicate that pilots hold an expectation that
controllers have some responsibility for the selection of flight rules, and an expectation that
this is a shared responsibility. However, controllers can be required to close airspace to VFR
traffic in conditions of low visibility. This closing action by controllers could be interpreted
as a weather and flight rule compatibility decisions similar to the judgement that pilots are
required to make. These controller decisions may lead pilots to have expectation that
controllers do influence the type of flight rules in use. Such controller decisions may lead
pilots to have an expectation of controller responsibility for flight rule determination. It could
be the case that allocation of responsibility, as defined by regulation or local practices for a
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task is influencing the perception of responsibility for the same task within different types of
airspace.
The MDS analysis indicates three groupings of response are present within the data. A
grouping of response for weather suitability, terrain and obstacle clearance suggests that
pilots deem themselves more responsible for these three key tasks. There is a correspondingly
lower level of expectation of controller responsibility or shared responsibility for these tasks.
Regulation defines that the controller is wholly responsible for aircraft separation within
Class A airspace. The MDS analysis also shows a close grouping of responses for aircraft
separation. Regulation defines that the controller has no responsibility for aircraft separation
within Class D airspace and H-Routes but does have full responsibility within Class A
airspace. These results could indicate that the location of responsibility with the controller for
the same task within several types of airspace is affecting pilot expectation. The pilot could
believe that controller access to a radar picture would elicit a level of responsibility from the
controller when the controller has no formal responsibility. The variation discovered within
pilot expectation of controller responsibility when no responsibility exists indicates that pilot
mental models may not be an accurate representation of the aviation regulations. The research
indicates that the attribution of controller responsibility is more strongly linked with task type
than airspace type. This mismatch in the pilot mental model could affect the shared mental
model across the systems.
One limitation of the research is that only the views of pilots have been solicited. To gain the
fullest possible picture of the operation controllers need to be included in future research.
This is especially the case if the shared mental model itself is to be formally evaluated.
However, our results indicate that this is a valuable direction to explore to understand the
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nature of the pilot-controller relationship. Another limitation of the research is a change to the
classification of airspace within the London control zones since conducting this research
Class A airspace is no longer in use for helicopters under VFR in London. However, the
MDS analysis indicates that grouping is predominantly associated with task type and not
airspace type. As such we assess our findings as having relevance in the current airspace
configuration.
Our findings lend support for methods that seek to characterise and understand sociotechnical
systems in greater detail (Waterson et al., 2015). At the very least, the findings further
support for activities that bring the reference materials and professional learning for system
actors: controllers and pilots, closer together to ensure to an improved collective
understanding. The results of this study may evidence the migration of work away from the
prescribed rules and regulations in response to a complex sociotechnical system which has
been subject to change over time. Snook refers to this as an ‘uncoupling of praxis’ from rules
and procedures (Snook, 2000). A pattern of working conditions between controllers and
pilots has emerged which is different from that which is prescribed. This way of working may
deliver resilience given the current operational landscape but any future change may render
such deviation less safe. Joint-optimisation through increased collaboration at the training and
procedural development intersection would improve system safety (Kleiner et al., 2015).
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Key Task Controller Pilot
Aircraft separation in Class A  
Aircraft separation for Special VFR Flight  
Aircraft separation elsewhere  
Terrain clearance  
Obstacle clearance  
Determination of the suitability of the weather  
Determination of the suitability of the flight rules  
Table 1: Allocation of responsibility for key tasks with deemed separation in use.
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Airspace Type Task
Hypothesised
Direction
Cases in
Hypothesised
Direction
p (one-tailed)
H-Routes
Terrain Clearance >3.75 7 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 7 > 0.990
Aircraft Separation >3.75 28 < 0.003*
Weather Suitability >3.75 15 = 0.570
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 17 = 0.292
Class D
Terrain Clearance >3.75 8 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 10 > 0.990
Aircraft Separation >3.75 25 < 0.003*
Weather Suitability >3.75 8 > 0.990
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 16 = 0.428
Class A
Terrain Clearance >3.75 9 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 15 = 0.570
Aircraft Separation <11.25 14 = 0.708
Weather Suitability >3.75 12 = 0.900
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 16 = 0.428
Table 2: Sign-test of the median expectation of responsibility (n = 30)
* indicates significant difference from hypothesised regulatory direction
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